Time and truth in plans by Hazelton, Lyman R., Jr.
N90- 20930 r a
Time and Truth in Plans*
Lyman R. Hazelton, Jr.
Flight Transportation Laboratory
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1 Introduction
Planning denotes the formulation of a detailed scheme, program, or method
worked out beforehand for the accomplishment of a goal. It involves the analysis of
the desired goal and its division into sub-goals which are subsequently treated in the
same way until a set of primitive objectives is obtained. A rational plan is prepared
by a reasoner for execution by one or more actors or agents who perform actions to
achieve the objectives. A reasoner is a cognitive system (human or machine) capable
of some level of logical deliberation.
The formulation of complex plans is an arduous process. Computers have been
employed to assist in the creation of plans almost from their inception. One of the first
uses of computers, shortly after World War II, was to solve large linear optimization
problems for military planners. However, the actual creation of a plan by a computer
did not occur until Sussman's work [1] in 1975. The reason for this delay is that
planning is a cognitive process not directly involving computation; that is, planning
requires symbol manipulation. Also, the composition of a plan is highly domain spe-
cific, so it is difficult to make a general planning program [2]. Domain dependent plan
generation is rule based, and the rules vary from domain to domain. The creation of
plans by a computer had to await the development of a mature symbol manipulation
language, such as Lisp.
2 The Single Actor Assumption
Sussman, and most of those who followed him, made a very powerful simplifying
assumption regarding the domain of a planner. This assumption is that all actions in
the domain are taken by a single actor, the plan executor. Furthermore, that actor is
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restricted to taking only one action at a time. This supposition constrains the plan
to consist of a serial sequence of primitive objectives. Because the sequence is non-
overlapping, there is no requirement for the planner to be aware of time in the general
sense. Time in this restricted domain i_ only measured by the conclusion of a task;
the clock time necessary to complete the task is unimportant. The assumption also
guarantees that the environment is not hostile. Because there is only one actor, and
it carries out the plan, there is no mode by which the plan may fail. This obviates
execution monitoring and plan repair.
The central reason for the employment of the single actor assumption is the lack of
a unified representation of the knowledge required by the more complex environment.
The standard representations employed by classical planners are sufficient to represent
domain knowledge alone. Information concerning causal or temporal relationships
is not domain knowledge in the normal sense. Rather, this kind of information is
an example of more abstract knowledge regarding relationships between facts known
about the domain. For example, let us analyze the statement, "After snow plowing
is completed, the runway will be returned to service." This statement is actually
three statements: (1) Snow plowing of the runway will be completed, (2) the runway
will be returned to service, and (3) the period of validity of statement (2) follows
that of statement (1) temporally. Notice that statement (3) is a statement about
statements (1) and (2), without regard to their domain meaning or content. Making
such meta-statements requires a mechanism within the representation language which
allows reference to statements that have previously been made.
The domain of classical planners also provides the reasoner with accurate informa-
tion about the initial state of the domain and a precise goal in terms of the required
final state.
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3 The Real World
Although such restricted environments do exist in reality, they are very rare and
usually contrived. In the "real world", there are multiple actors who can accomplish
tasks simultaneously. Some of the actors may be random or chaotic or even hostile to
the planner -- therefore a plan or a part of a plan may fail. There may be clock time
constraints on the accomplishment of a task, as well as relative temporal constraints
between tasks. Additionally, "real world" plans may depend on causality, a notion
completely missing in classical computer planners. A planner in the real world must
not only create a plan. It must schedule 1 the events of the plan, monitor the execution
of the plan and detect failures, and repair the plan and schedule in light of any failures
that occur.
In "real world" environments, domain information may be incomplete or erroneous.
The planner is required to discover spurious data and to be able to make reasonable
assumptions about missing or incorrect knowledge. Finally, "real world" planners often
must operate in a process management domain, in which there is no final goal, but
rather a continuous requirement to control and keep a system "functioning". A planner
with such a task must analyze the current and predicted future states of the system
and even create goals.
4 Forward Chaining Inference
Computer reasoners are based on rules. For the purposes of this discussion,
a rule is a generalized statement of deduction. Rules are composed of two parts, an
antecedent consisting of one or more conditions, and a consequent consisting of one
or more declarative statements regarding changes in the reasoner's knowledge. The
1Scheduling is the assignment of specific times to the objectives determined by a planning process.
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consequentof a rule is valid if and only if all of the conditions in its antecedentare
valid.
When a new statement about the reasoner'sknowledge is asserted, the reasoner
examines the antecedentsof its rules to see if any of them are applicable. Those
that are deemedappropriate are queued_(together with contextual information, in a
structure called a situation) for more detailed examination on the reasoner'sagenda.
When the reasonercompletes its analysisof a rule it gets the next rule from the agenda,
until the agendais empty. The reasonerthen has an up to date picture of the domain
until somenew observation is perceived.
5 Truth Maintenance
Knowledge about the world can be classified as observed fact and inferred fact.
Observed fact is information provided to the reasoner from some direct
observation of the domain.
Inferred fact is knowledge produced by the reasoner via the application of
its rules.
As its observations of the world change, a reasoner must change its inferred beliefs
in order to preserve a correct representation of reality. To accomplish this, the reasoner
must retain information regarding the evidence supporting each fact that it believes. In
practical applications, this information is kept in a tree structure. The nodes of the tree
represent known facts, while each arc represents an inference relation or dependency
(see Figure 1).
The base nodes in the tree represent observed facts. All other facts in the tree
are inferred facts. When an observation changes, all the inferred facts reachable by
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going down dependency arcs from the modified observation node must be investigated
for correctness. Those found to be incorrect under the new observation must either
be corrected or denied (i.e., deleted from the tree). All inference nodes which are
dependent on a changed or denied node must likewise be inspected.
The process of maintaining a correct set of beliefs through the use of evidence is
called Truth Maintenance ([3] and [4]). It should be noted that the process of truth
maintenance is a form of constraint propagation. It is said that the truth of a node is
constrained by the truth of its supporting nodes. The validities of all inferred facts are
constrained by the validity of the facts that were used as a basis for their deduction.
The inspection and update process propagates down the tree. The system of programs
that implements this constraint propagation process is called a Truth Maintenance
System or ThiS.
6 Assumptions and Truth Maintenance
When a reasoner is faced with incomplete information, it must resort to making
tentative assumptions about the questionable domain. The reasoner then proceeds to
infer the consequences of those assumptions on its representation of reality. This is
another classification of knowledge:
Assumed fact is knowledge "guessed" in order to proceed with a chain of
reasoning when the reasoner detects that it is missing some information.
A contradiction occurs whenever a rule deduces a fact that conflicts with another fact
already known to the system. Should a contradiction be detected, the reasoner is
forced to change one or more assumptions. Changing an assumption requires truth
maintenance similar but not identical to that required when changing an observation.
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Doyle [3] implicitly defines all non-deduced knowledge in his truth maintenance
system as assumption. There is a disadvantage to this view. It unnecessarily increases
the number of candidates when a contradiction is found. I prefer to view information
that the reasoner observes as different than that which is assumed because of some lack
of knowledge.
The process of changing an assumption when a contradiction is detected requires
two steps. The first is to find an appropriate candidate to change. This step, first
explored by Stallman and Sussman [5], is called "dependency directed backtracking".
The second step is to remove the offender and replace it with a different assumption,
if possible.
An important question needs to be addressed when reasoning with assumptions:
When is it appropriate to make an assumption? Clearly, just because we can make an
assumption does not mean that we should make it. Making unnecessary assumptions
is expensive and can be confusing. We need to have a criterion which determines the
need to make an assumption. I claim that the only time that we need to make an
assumption is when we want to know some missing information. Thus, when we are
in the middle of deducing something new about our world and we find that we are
missing some fact required in the chain of reasoning, we try to make an assumption
about what is unknown that is congruous to what we do know. Operationally, this
means that we need a special set of rules for making assumptions.
These assumptive rules have the same general form as normal rules. However, they
are different in three significant ways.
1. They are only invoked during the evaluation of the antecedent of a normal rule.
This insures that assumptions are only made when they are required.
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2. If all of the antecedentsof an assumptiverule aresatisfied, then the consequent
assertsthe assumption through the TMS, as usual. However, it is not necessary
to search for other rules which will use the assumption and enqueue situations on
the agenda. This is because if there were another rule requiring the assumption,
the assumption would already have been made.
3. Assumptive rules can be disabled or enabled by the system. There are circum-
stances under which the reasoner can detect that a particular assumption cannot
logically be made, and the associated assumptive rule(s) should not even be con-
sidered. If the circumstances change, the restriction may be lifted.
To understand why assumptive rules should be disabled, consider what must take
place if an assumption results in a contradiction. First, note that contradictions can
occur for two reasons:
1. Suppose that facts A and B are used by rule _1 to deduce fact C. Now suppose
that the resaoner observes that not C is true, and that A and B are true. In this
situation, either the user is mistaken about one of the facts, or the rule R1 is
incorrect. There is no way for the reasoner to determine which of these premises
is true, so it should stop and explain the situation and ask for a correction.
2. Suppose, again, that facts A and B are used by rule R1 to deduce fact C. Now
suppose that the reasoner observes that A is true, and that the system has no
knowledge about B. The fact that A is true will cause the reasoner to attempt
to run rule El. When the antecedent requiring B is evaluated, the reasoner will
come up empty handed and then endeavor to make an assumption about B. If
there is an appropriate assumptive rule AR1 which succeeds, assumption B' is
84
asserted.The C' resulting from _1 will also be an assumption. Now, if not ¢' is
true, a contradiction will occur.
Contradictions involving assumptions need to be looked at in greater detail. In the
example above, clearly the reasoner should deny both C' and B'. In addition, it should
mark the assumptive rule "_)_1 as unusable (i.e. disabled) as long as not C' is known to
be true. It can then consider other assumptive rules that may result in an alternative
hypothesis for B. If there are no more assumptive rules for B, then processing of )_1
must be terminated.
7 Time and Truth Maintenance
The truth maintenance systems of Doyle and DeKleer do not concern themselves
with an environment that changes with time. In these systems, either a statement is
supported by current data, or it is not.
When new data axe obtained, ltruthmaintenance systems change the implications
that were previously derived based on old knowledge. Consider the following rules for
a resource allocator:
1. You may only allocate a resource if it is not already allocated (in use).
2. If you do not know that a resource has been allocated, you may assume that it
is available (not allocated).
In a system with truth maintenance, if the allocator wants to assign a resource, it looks
for one which is uncommitted. Suppose that it only finds resources that are already
committed or about which it is ignorant. It then assumes that one of the uncommitted
resources is available. Basedon the evidence of that supposition, the resource can be
allocated. When the resource is allocated, the assumption that it is available is no
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longer true, and the TMS removesit. But the assumption of availability was the
evidencesupporting the action of allocating the resourcein the first place, so it must
removethe fact that it hasallocated the resource,too. This is a variant of the famous
statement, "This statement is not true." The system wants to state that the resource
is available and unavailable at the same time. While the TMS may be able to detect
circularities of this kind, it cannot properly resolvethem without modification.
The reasonthat the TMS gets into trouble in the resourceallocation problem is
that it hasno temporal knowledge. All of its statements must be true at all times. To
correct this difficulty, it must be able to reasonnot only why a statement is true, but
when it is true, as well.
Interest in temporal reasoning has increased recently. Notable work has been done
by James Allen ([6] and [7]), Tom Dean ([8] and [9]), and Yoav Shoham ([10] and [11]).
Prior to their work, the most that one could do was to "time tag" each fact in the
system with the clock time at which it was asserted.
The real break through in Allen's work is the idea that most temporal references
about facts are relative to temporal references of other facts. Allen further postulates
that temporal references are not points in time, but intervals. That is, there is a period
of time, which I like to call the "validity interval" of the fact, during which the fact is
true.
Very few, if any, facts are actually tagged with a clock time in Allen's system. In-
stead, most validity intervals are determined by constraints derived from relationships
to other facts. For example, two facts may be connected by an "after" relation: "The
runway may be returned to service after the plowing is completed." The significance
of this connection is that if the period of validity of the plowing operation is extended
(i.e., the plowing takes longer than was expected), the runway must be returned to
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service later. The period of validity of the plowing operation constrains the validity
period of the return to service. The result is another constraint propagation network,
but a rather complex one. While it has been shown [12] that the maintenance of the full
temporal network described by Allen is at least NP-hard, the approach has interesting
implications to truth maintenance systems.
In the truth maintenance constraint propagation process described above, the arcs
in the network identify a single relationship: implication. According to Allen, there are
thirteen different ways that one temporal interval can be related to another. Further,
there is a transitive algebra that allows one to compute the relationship between two
intervals that have known relationships to a common interval. This means that it is
not necessary to keep all of the arcs that could connect the nodes in the net, but only
a sufficient number of them to allow the others to be computed as necessary. The
computation, of a transitive relation is claimed to be fast, so it seems reasonable to
keep only a minimum network.
Every fact known to the system must have an associated temporal validity interval.
Facts which are true at all times have a special temporal interval "ALWAYS". While
we could also support facts which are never true with another special interval, it is
more efficient to simply exclude them all together. Note that a statement of the form
"X is never true" is a true statement over the interval ALWAYS.
In a planning domain, it is not enough to simply change the rules to incorporate
temporal intervals and use Allen's transitive operators. To see this, consider the re-
source allocator previously discussed. In a temporal environment, the rules must be
modified to include validity interval information:
1. You may only allocate a resource during a time interval T if it is not already
allocated at any time during 7".
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2. If you do not know that a resource has been allocated during a time interval T,
you may assume that it is available for allocation during T.
All that this addition does is to restrict the interval of time from all time to the
interval T. While it is a necessary addition to the rules for operation in a temporal
environment, the reader will see by stepping through the previous exercise that it is
not sufficient to solve the problem.
The solution to the problem can be realized by observing the logic employed by a
human scheduler. The human is aware of two times while constructing the schedule.
One of the times is the period during which the resource is to be allocated, called T
above. The other time is the actual time that the plan is being constructed, the plan-
ner's now. The planner is not only aware of the time sequence of the proposed schedule,
but of the sequence of events during plan construction. In a temporal environment,
contradiction can only happen between facts which have overlapping temporal valid-
ity intervals. In the same way that new information can change the truth of implied
facts in the TMS, new information can change the temporal validity intervals of facts
that were already known in the temporal system. This process goes beyond simply
computing the relationship between two facts in the network.
As an example, let us re-examine the resource allocation problem once again. Sup-
pose the allocator wants to assign a resource during a time interval T. It begins by
looking for an uncommitted resource. Suppose, as previously, it finds only resources
which are committed during T or about which it is ignorant concerning allocation sta-
tus during T. It can then assume, at time rl, that one of these unknown resources is
available during T. Note that rl is the time that the availability assumption is made,
and has nothing to do with the proposed schedule time T. The temporal validity in-
terval of the assumption is from rl to forever. On the basis of the assumption, the
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resourcecan be allocated during T at time r2, which is later than rl. This allocation
produces a fact that the resource is not available for the period T, with a temporal
validity interval from r2 to forever. The effect of this new fact is not, however, to
completely remove the assumption that the resource was available from rl to forever.
Rather, it removes the validity of that assumption from r2 to forever. This leaves the
assumption that the resource is available valid from rl to r2. Thus the evidence for the
allocation step remains valid.
This mechanism is still a form of constraint propagation, since the new information
about the plan constrains the temporal validity interval of old plan information. While
it is possible that this change may effect the validity intervals of yet other facts, in
practice it does so only rarely.
8 Conclusions
In this report, I have described some of the logical components of a rule based
planning and scheduling system. I have pointed out a deficiency in the conventional
truth maintenance approach to this class of problems and suggested a new mechanism
which overcomes the problem.
This extension of the idea of justification truth maintenance may seem at first to be
a small philosophical step. However, it embodies a process of basic human reasoning
which is so common and automatic as to escape conscious detection without careful
introspection. It is vital to any successful implementation of a rule based planning
reasoner.
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